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STARE  DECISIS  AS  AUTHORITY  AND  ASPIRATION
Randy J. Kozel*
The doctrine of stare decisis remains a defining feature of American law despite challenges
to its legitimacy and efficacy.  Even so, there is space between the role that stare decisis currently
plays and the potential that it offers.  The gap is evident in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court.  Though the Justices continue to underscore the fundamental status of stare decisis, the
Court’s opinions sometimes seem quick to depart from precedents whose reasoning has fallen out
of favor.
Using Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents as a case study, this Article explains how
the Court can invigorate the doctrine of stare decisis in pursuit of a stable and impersonal rule of
law.  Viewed against the backdrop of modern interpretive philosophy, Bivens might well be
anachronistic.  Yet by committing themselves to precedents of precisely that sort, the Justices can
demonstrate that changes in judicial personnel—and attendant shifts in the prevailing winds of
legal theory—do not always translate into changes in the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Whenever the next prospective Justice is nominated to the U.S. Supreme
Court, we can count on one thing: senators will ask about the nominee’s
attitude toward precedent.  We have witnessed these colloquies before,1 and
we will witness them again.  In uncertain times marked by pitched disagree-
ment, the importance of judicial views on precedent is the rare patch of com-
mon ground.2
Notwithstanding this attention, legal academics and political scientists
have challenged the relevance of precedent to Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing.  They acknowledge that the Justices routinely talk about the importance
of precedent.  Yet when push comes to shove, the argument goes, the rheto-
ric of stare decisis gives way to the reality of overruling.3  Scholars debate
whether the Supreme Court has “narrowed” precedent as opposed to “repu-
diating” it,4 and whether the Court has jettisoned precedent overtly or rather
1 See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. 74 (2017) [hereinafter Gorsuch Hearing] (recognizing the “heavy, heavy pre-
sumption in favor of precedent”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
195 (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearing] (referring to stare decisis as a “doctrine of
humility, and . . . a doctrine of constraint, a doctrine that binds courts and judges to the
law”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Roberts Hearing] (referring to the overruling of precedent as a “jolt to the legal system”
that is in tension with “principles of stability” but that nonetheless is sometimes required).
2 See William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 314 (observing
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s commitment to precedent has become a central topic of both
legal theory and legal politics”).
3 See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018
SUP. CT. REV. 121, 129 (describing stare decisis as “a virtue . . . that is far more often
preached than practiced”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed
Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1111–12 (2008).
4 Compare Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1861, 1868 (2014) (discussing the narrowing of precedent), with Daniel B. Rice & Jack
Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 875–77 (2019) (drawing distinc-
tions between repudiating, overruling, and confining precedent).
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by “stealth.”5  On the most bracing account, the doctrine of stare decisis is
taken seriously only by “suckers.”6
It is not just the efficacy of stare decisis that has come under fire.  The
doctrine also faces questions of legitimacy.  A provocative body of scholar-
ship, much of it proceeding from the originalist school of interpretation, has
challenged the lawfulness of deferring to flawed constitutional precedents.
Some scholars contend that upholding mistaken precedents violates the judi-
cial duty of fidelity to the Constitution,7 while others depict precedent as a
lesser form of law that cannot supplant the Constitution’s meaning as prop-
erly understood.8  Among the critics is Justice Thomas, who contends that
overruling “demonstrably erroneous” precedents is not simply a good idea,
but a constitutional imperative.9
This Article contends that things are not so bleak for stare decisis.  By
and large, the Justices continue to reaffirm the centrality of stare decisis to
the legal order.  This commitment to the “rhetoric”10 of precedent carries
important ramifications for the doctrine’s impact.  When the Supreme Court
confirms the foundational status of stare decisis, it sends a message to the
lower courts and to the legal system more broadly.  It also ensures that the
doctrine remains salient and available to future Justices for invocation.  The
authority of precedent remains intact, notwithstanding the occurrence of
occasional overrulings.  Stare decisis does not purport to forbid overrulings
altogether.11  The power of the doctrine is in furnishing a framework for
determining how and when overrulings may occur.
5 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v.
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (2010); see also Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invi-
tations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J.
779, 781 (2012) (identifying various mechanisms through which the law changes).
6 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 952 F.3d 591, 603
(5th Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 953 F.3d 381 (5th Cir.
2020).  For merchandise offered by a popular legal podcast to similar effect, see Stare Deci-
sis Is for Suckers, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST SHOP, https://strict-scrutiny-podcast-
shop.myshopify.com/collections/stare-decisis-is-for-suckers (last visited March 15, 2021).
7 See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23, 27–28 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005).
8 See Stephen E. Sachs, Precedent and the Semblance of Law, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 417,
419 (2018).
9 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10 Schauer, supra note 3, at 135; cf. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opin-
ion, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 196 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (defining rhetoric in terms of the effectiveness of language at evoking a
particular response in a particular audience).
11 I am referring here to the operation of stare decisis in the United States.  The expe-
rience in other jurisdictions has been different.  As a point of comparison, see, for exam-
ple, NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 125–27 (2008) (describing
evolving attitudes toward precedential strength in the United Kingdom during the twenti-
eth century).
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Stare decisis accordingly can foster stability even as the Court departs
from precedent in certain cases.  But the doctrine has not realized its poten-
tial.  At its best, stare decisis provides a mechanism not only for promoting
continuity and protecting expectations, but also for increasing the concep-
tual distance between the identity of the judge and the content of the law.  A
Supreme Court that gives meaningful deference to prior decisions—even
decisions that are flawed—confirms its status as an enduring institution.  This
is particularly evident when a decision reflects an analytical approach that
today’s Justices might not favor.  Deference in the face of methodological
disagreement is the epitome of humility and impersonality.  For stare decisis
to play the pivotal role the Justices have set out for it, there must be no doubt
that decisions retain their viability even when they embody interpretive phi-
losophies that have fallen out of fashion.
To illustrate the dynamics of precedent as well as the path to a more
robust doctrine of stare decisis, I consider the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,12 whose fifty-
year anniversary is the occasion of this Symposium. Bivens faces challenge in
some quarters as a decision in need of reconsideration.  My question is not
whether Bivens was correct to imply a cause of action for damages against
federal officers based on certain constitutional violations.  Irrespective of
whether Bivens was right when it issued, I view it as a strong case for stare
decisis.
Bivens does not rest on factual premises that have eroded over time.  It
has not proved unworkable as a procedural matter.  And it is not the kind of
exceptional, disastrous ruling whose consequences are so dire as to demand
reconsideration for that reason alone.  If there is cause for overruling Bivens,
it arises from the decision’s willingness to imply rights of action without a
clear textual hook, which is a mode of analysis that raises concerns among
some Justices.  Far from providing a “special justification” for overruling,13
this consideration points toward the importance of deference.  By upholding
a prior decision notwithstanding variations in methodological approaches
over time, the Justices can give effect to the recognition that stare decisis
promotes the rule of law by separating the content of legal rules from the
interpretive inclinations of those who currently occupy the bench.  The Biv-
ens example is thus significant both in its own right and as a microcosm of the
interplay between precedent and interpretive philosophy.
This Article begins by exploring the doctrine of stare decisis as a general
matter before proceeding to its implications for Bivens.  Part I examines
some of the leading challenges to stare decisis in recent years.  Part II
12 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
13 E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2486 (2018) (finding special justifications for overruling a precedent based on its
unworkability, its inconsistency with other decisions, and the erosion of its “underpin-
nings” over time); see also Randy J. Kozel, Special Justifications, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 471,
473–76 (2018) (discussing various possibilities for understanding the requirement of a spe-
cial justification for overruling).
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responds to the first of these challenges by defending the doctrine’s legiti-
macy.  In Part III, I move from legitimacy to efficacy, explaining the ways in
which precedent influences the trajectory of the law—even when a decision
ultimately is overruled.
Part IV applies these lessons to Bivens.  That decision is a powerful candi-
date for reaffirmance under the doctrine of stare decisis.  Moreover, ongoing
challenges to Bivens afford the Court a unique opportunity.  If there is a
problem with Bivens, it is that the case reflects an interpretive approach that
has fallen out of favor.  By upholding Bivens as precedent notwithstanding its
failings by today’s standards, the Court can demonstrate that shifts in the
prevailing winds of interpretive philosophy do not justify revisiting prece-
dent.  In committing itself to that principle, the Court can clarify the status of
Bivens while revitalizing the doctrine of stare decisis more generally, taking a
step toward fulfilling the “promise of precedent.”14
I. CHALLENGING STARE DECISIS
Recent challenges to the doctrine of stare decisis have tended to pro-
ceed on two fronts.  One claim is that deference to flawed precedents is ille-
gitimate, at least in certain circumstances, because it leads judges to act in
ways that exceed their lawful authority.15  The second claim is that, questions
of legitimacy aside, the doctrine of stare decisis is just not very important to
the Supreme Court’s resolution of constitutional disputes.
A. Legitimacy
Supreme Court Justices interpret the Constitution.  When flawed prece-
dents furnish a mistaken account of the Constitution’s meaning, the argu-
ment goes, Justices may not perpetuate the error in the name of stare decisis.
Instead, they must construe the document correctly, even if that means
departing from prior decisions.16  Whether the position is grounded in the
judicial oath, the nature of the Constitution, the institution of judicial review,
or some combination of these factors,17 its upshot is the same: there is a zone
14 RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 176 (2017).
15 Richard Fallon helpfully insists on precision in using the term “legitimacy” in consti-
tutional argument. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005).  This Article focuses on legitimacy as “gauged by legal norms.”
Id. at 1790.  As Professor Fallon suggests, however, some theories treat legal legitimacy as
overlapping in certain respects with sociological legitimacy and moral legitimacy. See id. at
1791.
16 E.g., Lawson, supra note 7, at 27–28; Paulsen, supra note 7, at 289–90; see also Randy
E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005) (“Accepting that judicial precedent can trump original mean-
ing puts judges above the Constitution they are supposed to be following, not making.”).
17 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 237 (2012) (noting that the Constitution “explicitly and self-referen-
tially obliges all officials to swear oaths to itself, not to conceded misinterpretations of it”);
Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of Article VI to Constitutional Supremacy,
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where deference to flawed constitutional precedents is not only ill-advised,
but illegitimate.
Commentators who raise concerns about stare decisis vary in the extent
to which they would permit the retention of flawed precedents.  For some,
paramount fidelity to the Constitution is consistent with deference to prece-
dents that have engendered significant reliance.18  For others, deference to a
flawed precedent may be lawful on a limited-time basis to ensure that the law
evolves at a gradual pace.19  A precedent might also warrant deference if it
reflects a plausible, longstanding interpretation of an uncertain provision,
reflecting a theory of constitutional “liquidation” often associated with James
Madison (and to which I will return below).20  Notwithstanding these excep-
tions, the Constitution’s true meaning—as perceived by today’s Court—gen-
erally must prevail over precedent when the two are at odds.  It follows that
there is a domain of constitutional adjudication in which deference to erro-
neous precedents is impossible to square with the judicial role as properly
understood.21
B. Efficacy
Apart from challenges to the legitimacy of stare decisis, there are also
questions about the doctrine’s efficacy.  The salience of these questions owes
to the confluence of two factors.  First, the Supreme Court remains willing to
reconsider and overrule its prior decisions.  Second, the Court has not offset
its overrulings with many reaffirmances of precedent on stare decisis
grounds.  While legal scholars and political scientists have challenged the
efficacy of stare decisis for decades,22 the Court’s engagements with prece-
110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 36 (2011) (focusing on the nature of the Constitu-
tion and connecting it with the basis for judicial review); id. at 37 (“[O]n a purely textual
level, the Constitution specifically prescribes that officials swear oaths to uphold it.”);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731
(2003) (“If Marbury is right, the judicial doctrine of stare decisis . . . is wrong.”).
18 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 239–40; see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (connecting stare
decisis with stability, predictability, and reliance).
19 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, 33
CONST. COMMENT. 451, 465 (2018) (book review) (describing the endorsement of
nonoriginalist precedent as “an originalist second best”).
20 See infra Section II.A.
21 A related, but distinct, strand of commentary posits that judicial precedent is a
lesser form of law than the Constitution’s true meaning as properly understood.  See Ste-
phen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 561 (2019) (characterizing stare decisis
as treating a prior judicial decision “as if it were law”).
22 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1111 (describing “acidly skeptical writing” challenging
the impact of stare decisis at the Supreme Court).  For prominent examples, see generally
THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT (2006), and JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
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dent over the past few years furnish additional evidence toward the same
conclusion.23
It is important to note that debates about the efficacy of stare decisis at
the Supreme Court do not bear on the impact of precedent as a vertical
matter.  The Court remains insistent on the bindingness of its decisions
within the lower courts.24  Likewise, decisions of federal appellate courts are
binding on district courts within their circuits.25  Judges are permitted to crit-
icize and doubt the superior-court precedents that bind them, but they
remain bound nonetheless.
The role of precedent is more complicated in horizontal operation.
Again, it is crucial to draw distinctions among courts.  The federal courts of
appeals treat their respective precedents as presumptively binding, albeit
while adopting different approaches to how and why circuit law may be
revised.26  Most district courts operate differently, giving little or no regard to
district precedent beyond its persuasive value.27  As for the Supreme Court,
the Justices continue to emphasize that the Court’s prior decisions are pre-
sumptively binding.  Yet the Justices also reserve  the right to overrule prior
decisions when there is a special justification for doing so.  The Court has
found such justifications to be present in multiple cases in recent years, on
issues such as the funding of public sector labor unions,28 the taxation of
internet sellers,29 states’ immunity from lawsuits brought in other states’
courts,30 and procedures for litigating cases under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause.31
These overrulings are made more resonant by the relative dearth of
counterexamples.  The Justices regularly decline invitations to revisit their
constitutional precedents when reconsideration is unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case before them.32  They occasionally go further by reaffirming a
decision while expressing doubts about its rationale, or even by invoking
23 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 135–39.
24 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989).
25 See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 491 (2016).
26 For example, some circuits allow three-judge panels to overrule circuit law provided
that they follow certain preliminary steps to ensure no objection from the off-panel judges.
See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e); Oakey v. US Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 232
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting the mechanism for a three-judge panel to overrule circuit law
after circulating the proposed opinion to off-panel judges).
27 See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J.
787, 801–02 (2012).
28 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2478 (2018).
29 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
30 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).
31 See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019).
32 E.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014) (plurality opinion) (constitu-
tionality of limits on campaign contributions); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
758 (2010) (plurality opinion) (incorporation of rights against the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 8 11-MAY-21 9:07
1978 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
stare decisis expressly as a reason for leaving matters settled.33  Even so, as
Professor Schauer suggests,34 there is a familiar pattern to many of the
Supreme Court’s engagements with precedent.  The Court begins by empha-
sizing the importance of continuity and applying the conventional stare deci-
sis factors.  But at the end of the day, it often concludes that the arguments in
favor of overruling are just too powerful, and the arguments in favor of stay-
ing the course are just too weak.  The result is a notable “rhetoric” of stare
decisis but an actual decision-making norm that is, in Professor Schauer’s
view, “tissue-thin.”35
II. PRECEDENT’S LEGITIMACY
Part I introduced challenges to stare decisis on grounds of constitutional
legitimacy and practical efficacy.  In this Part and the next, I offer historical,
theoretical, and doctrinal context that suggests a competing account.
I begin with the issue of legitimacy. Academic challenges to the legiti-
macy of stare decisis are formidable.36  Still, those challenges have not made
many inroads at the Supreme Court.  Even in the course of overruling its
precedents, the Court consistently reaffirms the fundamental role of stare
decisis.  This practice both reflects and reinforces the doctrine’s deep roots.
A. Historical Backdrop
A wealth of insightful commentary has examined the path of precedent
from the Founding to the modern era.  The historical analyses offer distinc-
tive accounts of, for example, common-law understandings of the judicial
power37 and the relationship between constitutional and statutory prece-
dent.38  My aim is to emphasize what the historical accounts have in common
at a general level.  In short, numerous commentators have recognized a long-
standing judicial attitude of respect for precedent.  The key question has
been—and continues to be—when that respect should yield.
Over two centuries ago, when Blackstone offered his influential descrip-
tion of judicial practice at common law, he noted the crucial role of prece-
33 See infra Section III.A.
34 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 135.
35 Id. at 132.
36 See supra Section I.A.
37 See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CON-
STITUTION 168 (2013) (developing an originalist argument that defines “the judicial power
to include a minimal concept of precedent, which requires that some weight be given to a
series of decisions”).
38 See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 713–14 (1999) (challenging the relevance of a prece-
dent’s constitutional, as opposed to statutory, nature as described in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888 (1985), and
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988)).
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dent.39  On Blackstone’s account, respect for precedent helps to steady the
path of the law, resolving what once “was uncertain.”40  Stare decisis also goes
hand in hand with the pursuit of judicial impersonality.  Respect for prece-
dent helps to ensure that a judge does not alter the law “according to his
private sentiments” and that legal principles do not “waver with every new
judge’s opinion.”41  At the same time, Blackstone recognized that precedent
is not absolute.  While “precedents and rules must be followed,” departures
are permitted when prior decisions are “flatly absurd,” “unjust,” or “contrary
to the divine law.”42  We can understand Blackstone as recognizing a baseline
presumption of respect for precedent, which is rebutted if a decision is espe-
cially problematic in its reasoning or results.
Madison likewise appreciated the role of precedent.  He noted the need
for legal provisions to be “liquidated,” or settled, through practice.43  Once
the process of liquidation had occurred, rules that previously were murky
would have clearer content, and they accordingly would receive some insula-
tion from revision.  Like Blackstone, Madison emphasized both stability and
impersonality, responding to concerns about “disturb[ing] the established
course of practice” or allowing a single judge to give too much “effect to his
own abstract and individual opinions.”44  Madison also acknowledged situa-
tions in which precedent should yield: namely, when a decision crosses the
line between interpreting a law and “repeal[ing] or “alter[ing]” it.45  Caleb
Nelson characterizes Madison as recognizing the importance of stare decisis
in the face of reasonable disputes over the content of the Constitution, but as
39 Though Blackstone’s work was salient during the Founding, as reflected in part by
Hamilton’s citations in The Federalist Nos. 69 and 84, discussions of precedent at common
law by no means began with his Commentaries.  For an analysis of earlier thinking, with
special attention to the relationship between constancy and change, see Bernadette Mey-
ler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 580 (2006).
40 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
41 Id.
42 Id. at *69–70; see also id. at *69 (recognizing an exception to stare decisis for deci-
sions that are “evidently contrary to reason”).
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 182 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“All new
laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”); see also
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 359, 361 (Marvin Meyers
ed., rev. ed. 1981) (“It . . . was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily
used in such a charter . . . .”).
44 Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER, supra note 43, at 390, 391–92.
45 Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 211 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) (“None will
deny that precedents of a certain description fix the interpretation of a law.  Yet who will
pretend that they can repeal or alter a law?”); see also id. (noting the distinction between
“expound[ing]” the Constitution and “alter[ing]” it); Lee, supra note 38, at 665–66 (dis-
cussing this distinction).
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supporting overrulings where precedents are “demonstrably erroneous” in
their interpretation of the law.46
Placing Blackstone and Madison side by side reveals important similari-
ties.  For both, stare decisis is the rule, yet overrulings are permitted in light
of special circumstances—for example, if a decision is “most evidently con-
trary to reason”47 (on Blackstone’s account) or incompatible with the clear
text of a legal provision (on Madison’s account).48  The same spirit animates
Hamilton’s statement in The Federalist No. 78 that “strict rules and prece-
dents” help “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts.”49  His account
suggests a conception of judicial precedents as fostering impersonality and
constraint, even while remaining subject to reconsideration under appropri-
ate circumstances.
In its essential structure, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of prece-
dent is consistent with the vision set forth by the likes of Blackstone, Madison,
and Hamilton.  In case after case, the Court has announced that prior deci-
sions warrant presumptive respect, but that any decision can be overruled in
the face of a “special justification.”50  Areas of disagreement remain, includ-
ing whether a decision’s faulty logic establishes a prima facie case for overrul-
ing or whether there must be some affirmative problem with a decision over
and above its wrongness.51  Moreover, when describing the role of prece-
dent, different Justices have provided different emphases.  Justice Brandeis
noted the Supreme Court’s duty to correct its own constitutional mistakes.52
46 Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 14
(2001) (“If a past decision was demonstrably erroneous . . . it lacked the binding force of
true liquidations.”).
47 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *70.
48 See Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, supra note 45, at 211.
49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
50 See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (instructing that “any departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification”).  For recent invocations,
see, for example, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019); Janus v. Am. Fed’n
of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018); South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2101 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
51 Cf. AMAR, supra note 17, at 235 (contending that “absent special countervailing con-
siderations . . . today’s Court may properly overrule yesterday’s case simply because today’s
Court believes the old case incorrectly interpreted the Constitution”). Compare Janus, 138
S. Ct. at 2479 (considering “the quality of [a precedent’s] reasoning”), with id. at 2497 n.4
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the assessment of a precedent’s reasoning as duplicative
of the threshold determination that it is flawed).
52 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that while “[s]tare decisis is usually the wise policy,” the Supreme
“Court has often overruled its earlier decisions” in constitutional cases, “where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible”).  Justice Brandeis’s view is perhaps
unsurprising in light of his statement (according to Holmes) responding to the American
Law Institute’s project of producing restatements of the law: “Why I am restating the law
every day.” PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 50
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By contrast, Justices Stewart53 and Harlan54 focused on the value of distance
between the membership of the Court and the content of legal rules.
Dueling sentiments sometimes appear within the confines of a single
opinion.  For example, in a recent dispute over the constitutionality of sen-
tencing procedures, Justice Sotomayor echoed Hamilton’s description of pre-
cedent as a check against “an arbitrary discretion” within the judiciary.55  At
the same time, she acknowledged that fidelity to precedent may yield to a
special justification for overruling—such as the “ero[sion]” of a precedent’s
“underpinnings.”56  Years earlier, Justice Scalia observed that stare decisis
would be “no doctrine at all” if mere disagreement were enough to depart
from precedent,57 while also identifying a decision’s “unacceptable conse-
quences”58 or “egregious[ ]” wrongness59 as potentially sufficient to rebut
the presumption of deference.
Whichever way one resolves debates about the operation of stare decisis,
and whatever one believes should be the fate of a given decision that has
come under challenge, respect for the role of precedent is an established
phenomenon that maintains its currency today. A declaration that stare deci-
sis violates the Constitution would be a novelty.
B. Endorsement
Few doctrines receive loftier praise from the Supreme Court than does
stare decisis.  Justices describe precedent as fundamental to the rule of law60
and “a vital rule of judicial self-government.”61  They invoke Hamilton in
characterizing precedent as a bulwark against judicial decisionmaking based
on “an arbitrary discretion.”62  They connect precedent with the essential sta-
bility and integrity of the American legal regime.63  They depict respect for
(1982) (quoting AM. L. INST., THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 276 (2d ed.
1973)).
53 See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(criticizing overrulings that are based on “a change in our membership”).
54 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending
that “altered disposition, or subsequent membership on the Court,” is not “warrant for
overturning a deliberately decided rule of Constitutional law”).
55 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1888))).
56 Id. at 119 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
57 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
58 Id.
59 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
60 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014).
61 Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015).
62 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
63 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
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precedent as a means of bolstering impersonality by ensuring that disagree-
ments do not translate into constant vacillation.64  As Allison Larsen notes,
these depictions of stare decisis cohere with a broader commitment to imper-
sonality as a defining legal norm.65
The same conception of precedent is reinforced by the Justices’ state-
ments while awaiting confirmation.  Chief Justice Roberts explained that it
takes more than disagreement to justify departing from a prior decision.66
He and other nominees have linked fidelity to precedent with the humility of
the individual Justice and respect for the Court as an institution.67
Animating these sentiments is a worry that, in a world without respect
for precedent, the Constitution could become “nothing more than what five
Justices say it is.”68  That effect might be diluted to the extent that a given
Justice believes reliance implications to be legally relevant, such that the cor-
rect answer to today’s legal problem must take into account the impact of
yesterday’s decisions.69  Yet not every judicial philosophy will accord the same
import to reliance in the face of a perceived interpretive mistake, leaving
open the possibility that shifts in constitutional understanding could mani-
fest themselves in short order as changes in the governing rules.70
The Justices hold up stare decisis as a remedy for this problem.  That
function, in turn, informs the manner in which the doctrine operates.  To
return to Justice Scalia’s phrase, stare decisis is “no doctrine at all” if it is
overcome by simple disapproval of a decision on the merits.71  The path of
the law should depend on more than the “present doctrinal disposition[s]”
of those who currently occupy the bench.72  In standing by decisions of the
past, today’s Justices both ensure and demonstrate that constitutional law
64 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986).
65 See Allison Orr Larsen, Supreme Court Norms of Impersonality, 33 CONST. COMMENT.
373, 373–74 (2018).
66 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 1, at 144.
67 Gorsuch Hearing, supra note 1, at 76 (referring to excessive willingness to overrule as
reflecting “hubris inappropriate to the judicial role”); Kagan Hearing, supra note 1, at 163
(noting that judges “should view prior decisions with a great deal of humility and defer-
ence”); Roberts Hearing, supra note 1, at 158 (connecting “humility” with “respect for prece-
dent that forms part of the rule of law”); cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (1996) (urging caution before disrupting
settled interpretations).
68 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16.
69 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1989)
(explaining how reliance interests can affect perceptions of the correct result under some
theories of judging).
70 E.g., Solum, supra note 19, at 461 (considering the legitimacy of adhering to prece-
dent during the transition between interpretive regimes); cf. Corinna Barrett Lain, Mostly
Settled, But Right for Now, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 372 (2018) (discussing the use of prece-
dent to lend stability while remaining open to updating in light of considerations such as
social change).
71 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
72 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
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doesn’t constantly transform itself as competing judicial philosophies fight
for primacy at the Court.  Instead, stare decisis takes the resolution of consti-
tutional disputes out of time.  It embodies the view that the law ought not
undergo dramatic shifts based on election returns and attendant changes in
judicial personnel.  Irrespective of whether the dominant interpretive philos-
ophy of today matches the dominant interpretive philosophy of the past,
there must be continuity that transcends identity.73
Maintaining continuity does not require standing by every mistake.
Stare decisis allows departures from precedent based on special justifications,
including factual changes and workability problems.74  Nor does deference
to precedent mean every utterance in a judicial opinion is entitled to stare
decisis effect.  The Justices continue to recognize that there are some judicial
propositions, such as ancillary observations disconnected from the facts of a
given case, that do not warrant deference going forward.75
What stare decisis demands is the possibility of reaffirming a prior deci-
sion despite one’s conviction that it is mistaken.  Numerous Justices have
expressed, and continue to express, the belief that it takes more than disa-
greement to justify an overruling.76  A robust norm of stare decisis means
personnel changes will not matter quite as much, because a newly arriving
Justice will sometimes (not always) defer to precedent regardless of her indi-
vidual perspective on the law.  That furnishes a response to Justice Marshall’s
concern about “[p]ower” rather than “reason” serving as the “currency of
73 See KOZEL, supra note 14, at 105.  This conception of stare decisis departs from argu-
ments that judicial treatment of precedent should ebb and flow depending on prevailing
jurisprudential approaches.  On the latter point, see Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butter-
flies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2243 (2006) (defending the view that judicial
approaches to precedent should change over time).
74 E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(rejecting an absolutist view of stare decisis); id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (same).  I am referring here to the Supreme Court’s approach to its
own precedents via the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis.  Vertical stare decisis plays by
different rules. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 25, at 155.  In domains outside the
Supreme Court, precedent often binds in a far more stringent fashion. See id. at 491; Amy
Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2003).  Of
course, the Article V amendment process always remains available if the people wish to
correct the Justices’ perceived mistakes directly. Cf. Richard Albert, Constitutional Hand-
cuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 665 (2010) (describing the power of amendment as “giving
citizens the key to unlock their constitutional handcuffs”).
75 Examples include hypotheticals and asides, which fit the conventional definition of
nonbinding dicta. See KOZEL, supra note 14, at 74–76; cf. Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1951 (2017) (defining propositions’ forward-looking effect by focusing
on the rule set forth by the issuing court).
76 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2497 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); Roberts Hear-
ing, supra note 1, at 144.  For an argument challenging this position, see AMAR, supra note
17, at 235.
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th[e] Court’s decisionmaking.”77  Even if stare decisis is not absolute, and
even if different Justices reach different conclusions about how it applies, the
doctrine’s very existence increases the chances that a given precedent will
survive regardless of whether there are five Justices who agree with it.
This, at least, is what the Justices say about stare decisis.  How can we be
sure they mean it?  One answer is that we should presume the sincerity of the
Justices’ statements about their reasons for action. But for those who are
skeptical, there is another reason to conclude that the Justices are being gen-
uine and serious in their discussions of the doctrine.  It is here that the schol-
arly challenges to the legitimacy of stare decisis play an important role.  As we
have seen, there are sophisticated and intellectually respectable arguments
for sharply limiting the role of stare decisis on grounds of legitimacy.  Those
arguments have been available in the academic literature for decades, and
they have developed further over time.78  Given the robust debate over the
relationship between precedent and legal interpretation, a Justice who
harbors doubts about stare decisis has no reason to pay the doctrine lip ser-
vice.  The Justice could simply set forth the legal basis of those doubts—pre-
cisely as Justice Thomas has done.79 When the Justices instead reiterate their
commitment to stare decisis as integral to impersonality, continuity, and the
rule of law, we may reasonably conclude that they believe what they say.
Stating a principle is not the same as applying it, and Professor Schauer
is surely right to point out tension between what the Justices say about prece-
dent and what they do with it.80  But perhaps the problem is more opera-
tional than philosophical.  Perhaps, that is, the Court would give more
respect to precedent if the rules of the game were better understood and
more clearly defined.  That project begins with unpacking, in basic terms, the
legal rationale for deferring to certain precedents notwithstanding their
flaws.
C. Theoretical Foundations
Though the Supreme Court consistently depicts stare decisis as legiti-
mate even when it departs from a given decision, it has declined to offer a
deep theoretical account of that legitimacy.  The Court has referred to stare
decisis as a “principle of policy,”81 but in doing so it has not indicated that
the doctrine lacks a basis in law.82  Instead, it has juxtaposed the “principle of
77 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78 See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
79 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980–81 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
80 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 135.
81 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (quoting Helvering, 309 U.S. at 119).
82 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 581–82 (2001) (interpreting the “principle of
policy” language to mean that “stare decisis, like many principles of constitutional stature,
is capable of being overridden”).
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policy” against  a “mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”83
That tells us deference to precedent is defeasible, but it does not explain
where the doctrine comes from or how it fits into the constitutional design.
The academic literature, by comparison, offers theories of legitimacy
that draw on a range of methodological and normative premises.  On some
of those accounts, the case for stare decisis is straightforward.  For example,
to the extent one takes a positivist approach to the law, the lawfulness of stare
decisis flows from its acceptance.84  The validity of deferring to precedent is
legitimized by judges’ and Justices’ repeated affirmations of the fundamental
role of stare decisis.85  In light of the doctrine’s well-established position,
judicial opinions retain their presumptive validity and authority even when a
new generation of judges perceives them as flawed, and irrespective of
whether perceived flaws relate to inconsistency with original meanings, fail-
ure to reflect contemporary understandings, or something else.86  The pre-
vailing practice is one that requires a special justification for overruling, while
permitting departures when such a justification is present.
The validity of stare decisis likewise is clear from the standpoint of com-
mon-law constitutionalism, which emphasizes the development of constitu-
tional principles through a common-law style of interpretation that infuses
judicial decisions with binding (though rebuttable) effect.87  The same is
true of pragmatism, characterized by its focus on the costs and benefits of
selecting one legal rule over another.88
The legitimacy of stare decisis becomes more contested if one gravitates
toward certain strands of originalism.  This has been true for decades,89 but
the tension has become increasingly evident following Justice Thomas’s argu-
ment that the Constitution prohibits judicial adherence to demonstrably
83 Helvering, 309 U.S. at 119; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363 (quoting Helvering,
309 U.S. at 119).
84 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 110 (2d. ed. 1994) (discussing the relevance
of the “practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by refer-
ence to certain criteria”); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 79 (2015) (describing
Hart’s view as treating the Constitution as valid “simply by virtue of its acceptance,” which is
“a matter of social fact”); Fallon, supra note 3, at 1113.
85 See supra Section II.B.
86 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1122–23 (arguing that precedents are valid because they
are “accepted as such within current practices of law and adjudication”).
87 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–36 (2010); cf. JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 121–22 (2011) (defending the common-law development of
precedent as consistent with the constitutional framework).
88 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 149 (2010)
(“[T]he judge must make a pragmatic decision, weighing the harms and benefits of stabil-
ity against change.”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
925–26 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing ways in which overruling a precedent
could affect reliance interests); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506
(2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8; Paulsen, supra note 8; see also KOZEL, supra note 14, at
106–07 (describing the tension between originalism and stare decisis in the view of some
scholars).
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erroneous precedents.90  Even so, possibilities exist for harmonizing original-
ism and precedent across a wide swath of cases.
The Constitution does not expressly authorize fidelity to precedent.  If
stare decisis has an implicit textual font, a leading possibility is Article III’s
reference to the “judicial Power.”91  Perhaps the judicial power was originally
understood as including some degree of respect for precedent.92  Hence the
argument of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport that the judicial power
encompasses a limited doctrine of stare decisis and that the Constitution
empowers judges to develop supplemental rules of precedent.93
An alternative approach (which I have developed in prior work) looks
not to the judicial power of Article III, but to broader principles of constitu-
tional structure.94  The structural argument begins with Article III’s depic-
tion of the judiciary as different in kind from the other branches of
government.95  Unlike the Executive and the Legislature, the Judiciary is a
continuous body.  The grant of life tenure and salary protection means fed-
eral judges are insulated from official and electoral control.96  Moreover,
while judges on the inferior federal courts must confront the prospect of
Supreme Court review, there is no tribunal superior to the Supreme Court.
If the Justices are to face constraints on their decisionmaking, those con-
straints must come from somewhere else.
The most obvious constraining force is the Constitution’s text, which
compels certain choices and takes other options off the table.  But the Con-
stitution contains its share of generalities that complicate the ability of the
text to dictate concrete outcomes through its sheer, literal force.  That
explains Madison’s observation that the political and judicial branches would
have work to do in settling the meaning of uncertain provisions.97
Areas of textual uncertainty raise concerns about leaving the Justices
without a meaningful source of constraint.  Precedent offers a response.  A
norm of deference to precedent makes it more difficult for the Justices to
cast votes in light of their personal philosophies without regard for the sys-
temic effects of legal change.  Stare decisis creates an “argumentative bur-
90 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980–81 (2019) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); id. at 1985 (“[M]y view of stare decisis requires adherence to decisions made by the
People—that is, to the original understanding of the relevant legal text—which may not
align with decisions made by the Court.”).
91 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
92 For a different argument that draws on Article III’s reference to the judicial power
as part of the justification for stare decisis, see Fallon, supra note 82, at 588.
93 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 37, at 168–70; cf. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV.
419, 447 (2006) (contending that “by 1787–1789, the concept of judicial power included
significant respect for precedent”).
94 See generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
789 (2018).
95 See id. at 804–07.
96 See id.
97 See Nelson, supra note 46, at 11–12.
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den” that future Justices must carry in explaining their decision to break
from settled law.98  Against this backdrop, we might understand a judicial
promise to support the Constitution as encompassing not only the docu-
ment’s text, but also interpretations issued by the Supreme Court in the exer-
cise of its lawful authority under Article III.99
One need not embrace this structural argument in order to accept stare
decisis as lawful and legitimate.  Indeed, my point is that powerful arguments
for the legitimacy of stare decisis are available from a variety of perspectives
and across a range of interpretive philosophies.  For those who endorse theo-
ries such as positivism, common-law constitutionalism, or pragmatism, the
legitimacy of deferring to precedent is difficult to dispute.  And there are
even arguments for harmonizing stare decisis with fidelity to the Constitu-
tion’s original meaning.  Just as the commitment to precedent transcends
matters of judicial identity and judicial philosophy, so, too, do the arguments
for the legitimacy of stare decisis.
III. PRECEDENT’S EFFICACY
As we saw in Part I, some judges and scholars have challenged the rele-
vance of horizontal stare decisis by pointing to the Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to reconsider its decisions.  Those challenges draw support from the
Court’s recent overruling of precedents on issues including labor union
financing, internet selling, state sovereign immunity, and takings of private
property.100
Yet counterpoints do exist.  In addition, stare decisis can exert meaning-
ful force on the trajectory of the law and the structure of legal opinions not-
withstanding the occurrence of overrulings.  Finally, the Justices continue to
emphasize the importance of stare decisis even as they depart from particular
decisions. This rhetoric has independent force, helping to ensure that the
doctrine remains intact and that arguments for deferring to precedent stay
close at hand.
98 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 580 (1987).
99 Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 304 (2016) (link-
ing the promissory content of an oath to the “contemporaneous meaning of its terms”).
Fidelity to precedent need not rise to the level of fidelity to clear text.  A judge could
deem herself strictly bound to follow the Constitution’s express commands while recogniz-
ing that deference to judicial precedent is rebuttable rather than absolute.  In other words,
the judge could acknowledge constitutional text as paramount but adopt an “understand-
ing of the Constitution that supplements the bare text with prior judicial opinions.”  Fred-
erick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 45, 51 (1994).
100 See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt,
139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018).
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A. Where Precedent Does Its Work
Despite its willingness to reconsider its prior pronouncements, the
Supreme Court continues to reaffirm the importance of precedent in mean-
ingful ways.  One way is the Justices’ insistence on a strict doctrine of vertical
precedent, as noted above.101  The Court has left no doubt that lower courts
are rigidly bound by its decisions.102  This is true even of decisions the Jus-
tices themselves seem to have undercut.103  Unless and until the Court takes
the unequivocal step of overruling itself, the lower courts must abide by what
it previously held.  That rule ensures the centrality of Supreme Court prece-
dent in the lower courts, which decide many more cases than the Supreme
Court each year.104
The Supreme Court’s limited docket is notable in another respect.  The
Court grants only a small fraction of the petitions for certiorari it receives.  In
deciding which cases to hear, the Court presumably gives some regard to
precedent.  That is, the Justices may deny certain petitions for certiorari on
the rationale that the relevant doctrines are settled and there is no sense in
disrupting them even if their reasoning has some weaknesses.105  The extent
of this phenomenon is unclear, but to discount it entirely would be a
mistake.106
These two factors—the strict doctrine of vertical precedent and the
Supreme Court’s certiorari practice—are mutually reinforcing.  Among the
most important questions the Court asks in exercising its certiorari power is
whether there is a split of authority among the federal courts of appeals.107
Splits are relatively likely to attract the Justices’ attention, while issues that
have not generated sharp disagreement face a more onerous path to the
Supreme Court’s docket.108
101 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
102 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
103 Id. at 480–81, 484.
104 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/
StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf (noting that during the October 2018 Term, the Supreme
Court issued seventy-two merits opinions).
105 Professor Schauer notes this point in raising the possibility that “[i]f a strong stare
decisis norm exists, the cases controlled by it will not be disputed, or litigated, or appealed,
or selected by the Supreme Court for decision.”  Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis and the
Selection Effect, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 124, 128 (Christopher
J. Peters ed., 2013); Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme
Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 400 n.76 (2007).
106 Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921,
1942 (2017) (recognizing the importance of “agenda control” in understanding the role of
stare decisis).
107 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (noting the relevance of whether “a United States court of
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court
of appeals on the same important matter”).
108 See Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1345, 1359–60 (2018).
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For legal questions the Supreme Court has already addressed, the strict
doctrine of vertical precedent makes splits less likely.  Every lower court is
required to do as the Supreme Court has done, irrespective of whether the
relevant precedent seems poorly reasoned, outdated, or harmful.  Judges on
the lower courts occasionally respond by penning concurrences explaining
that their hands are tied but urging the Court to reconsider its approach.109
Nevertheless, the combination of a strict doctrine of vertical precedent with a
preference for cases that have divided the lower courts serves to decrease the
chances that issues resolved in the Court’s prior decisions will return to its
merits docket for reconsideration.
As for the cases the Supreme Court chooses to hear, stare decisis affects
them as well.  Even if the Court eventually decides to overrule a decision, the
Justices’ often stretch that process over several years out of reluctance to
effect abrupt changes of course.110  The intervening period provides time for
stakeholders to adjust their expectations in anticipation of a possible
change.111
Occasionally, the Justices invoke precedent not simply to slow the pace
of legal change, but to preserve the rule at issue. Two of the most prominent
examples are Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,112 which
reaffirmed the core holding of Roe v. Wade113 regarding the constitutional
right to nontherapeutic abortion, and Dickerson v. United States,114 which rein-
forced the Miranda115 warnings as constitutional imperatives.  Both of these
examples are equivocal in some sense: Casey retained Roe’s core holding but
abandoned its trimester framework,116 and some commentators view Dicker-
son less as a victory for stare decisis than a judicial rebuff of congressional
intrusion.117  Even so, both opinions expressly invoke the doctrine of stare
decisis as part of their rationale.118
Along similar lines is the Court’s recent decision in Gamble v. United
States, reaffirming that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit prosecutions
by separate sovereigns.119  The Court was skeptical of the challenge to the
relevant precedent on the merits, but it also made clear that stare decisis had
109 See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921,
959 n.178 (2016).
110 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018); Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018).
111 Cf. Richard M. Re, Second Thoughts on “One Last Chance”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 634, 636
(2019) (noting that by indicating its willingness to reconsider a precedent, the Supreme
Court “giv[es] other actors an opportunity to avert or mitigate the Court’s decision”).
112 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
115 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
116 See 505 U.S. at 872–73 (plurality opinion).
117 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 3, at 134 n.72.
118 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46; Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
119 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1965–66 (2019).
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a role to play.  Stare decisis, the Court explained, raises the bar for those who
propose interpretations that run contrary to the Court’s caselaw.120
Much the same was true of Kisor v. Wilkie, the 2019 decision upholding
the Auer doctrine of administrative law.  Five Justices agreed that, whatever
the merits of Auer, stare decisis warranted its upholding.121  By and large, the
majority explained, the “arguments about abandoning precedent” were “vari-
ants of [the] merits claims.”122  In 2020, Chief Justice Roberts offered similar
sentiments in his concurrence in the judgment in June Medical Services L.L.C.
v. Russo.123  Voting to follow a precedent that invalidated a requirement gov-
erning hospital privileges for physicians who perform abortions, the Chief
Justice left no doubt that he viewed the precedent as “wrongly decided.”124
Even so, he distinguished the question whether the decision was correct from
the question whether it should be overruled.  An overruling, he explained,
requires something more than wrongness.125
Other cases find the Court declining to reconsider precedents without
necessarily reaffirming them.  Emblematic is McDonald v. City of Chicago.126
The McDonald litigation, which involved the constitutionality of a firearm law,
included a request for the Court to revisit its caselaw incorporating the Bill of
Rights against the states.127  The Court noted the extensive criticism of its
existing doctrine, which reflects a narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.128  Nevertheless, it declined to revisit
an interpretation that had been central to its caselaw for decades.129  A few
years earlier, a plurality took a similar stance in response to a request to ramp
up the First Amendment protection afforded to campaign contributions,
which are easier to restrict than independent expenditures under existing
law.130
Ultimately, while the Court has departed from significant decisions, it
“ordinarily adheres to precedent.”131  Whether by keeping cases off the
Court’s docket, counseling restraint and caution in reconsidering past deci-
120 See id. at 1969.
121 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422–23 (2019) (“Of course, it is good—and impor-
tant—for our opinions to be right and well-reasoned.  But that is not the test for overturn-
ing precedent.”).
122 Id. at 2423.
123 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–34 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
124 Id. at 2133.
125 Id. (“The question today . . . is not whether [the relevant precedent] was right or
wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.”).
126 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
127 Id. at 752.
128 See id. at 756.
129 See id. at 758.
130 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 198–200 (2014) (plurality opinion).  The
Court has also stood by a number of its statutory precedents in recognizing that
“[r]especting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.”  Kimble v. Marvel Ent.,
LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015).
131 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1412 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-MAY-21 9:07
2021] stare  decisis  as  authority  and  aspiration 1991
sions or, more rarely, sparking an outright reaffirmance, stare decisis exerts
steadying, stabilizing pressure on the law.  And as explained in the next Sec-
tion, the Court’s discussions of stare decisis are significant in their own right,
above and beyond the outcomes they explicate.
B. Rhetoric and Doctrine
The previous Section focused on what the Supreme Court does with pre-
cedent.  What the Court says about precedent is also instructive.  Part II
examined the Court’s repeated statements underscoring the fundamental
role of stare decisis.  I argued that these statements demonstrate the Justices’
confidence in the legitimacy of stare decisis.  But there is another implica-
tion, one that deals with the efficacy of precedent.  By continuing to describe
stare decisis as important, the Court helps to make it important.
When today’s Justices confront an issue that the Court previously has
resolved, they tend to apply the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides that
departures from precedent may not occur without special justification.  This
approach reinforces the doctrine of stare decisis irrespective of whether the
Court overrules the specific case under review.  The Court has refrained from
challenging stare decisis from the outside by calling its foundations into
doubt.  Instead, the Justices (with the exception of Justice Thomas) generally
take the doctrine as given and operate within the established framework, ask-
ing whether there is a special justification for overruling and considering fac-
tors such as factual change, procedural workability, and reliance.  As then-
Judge Gorsuch noted during his confirmation hearing, there is “an entire law
about precedent,” or “[p]recedent about precedent,” which guides the Jus-
tices’ deliberations when they confront a request for overruling.132
Viewed from one angle, the Court’s expressions of regard for stare deci-
sis might look like empty rhetoric.  To the extent those discussions have legal
effect, the argument goes, it is to weaken stare decisis by generating a litany
of acceptable reasons for departing from precedent in future cases.133  There
is, however, another way of looking at things.  The Court has continued to
trumpet the respect owed to precedent and the fundamental role of stare
decisis in the constitutional order.  By leaving the doctrine’s infrastructure in
place, the Court preserves the possibility that precedent will influence its
decisionmaking in the years ahead.
Some onlookers might perceive the Court’s discussions of stare decisis as
“tactical” language, as opposed to “an effort to communicate genuinely and
create a field of common understanding.”134  It is impossible to speak with
certainty about the Justices’ private motivations.  As we have seen, however,
there are reasonable and intellectually respectable grounds for challenging
132 Gorsuch Hearing, supra note 1, at 74.
133 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 140 (describing “the norm of stare decisis” as having
been “weaponized”).
134 Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1869
(2009).
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the foundations of stare decisis.135  Justice Thomas has embraced such an
argument and signaled his intention to overhaul the Court’s jurisprudence of
precedent.136  If other Justices shared his view of stare decisis, it would be a
simple matter for them to say so, and to explain their objections in like
terms.  That the Justices continue to laud stare decisis even when there are
reasonable ways to contest it suggests the doctrine’s centrality to contempo-
rary constitutional thought.
C. Deference as Checking Twice
When today’s Justices are inclined to view a precedent as flawed—and
potentially subject to overruling—stare decisis asks them to take another
look, just to be sure.  That process, which reflects the role of stare decisis in
fostering humility and impersonality, is interwoven with the structure of the
doctrine.  Against this backdrop, we can understand the familiar stare decisis
factors as geared toward evaluating a precedent’s soundness from a variety of
perspectives.  The objective is to reserve the extraordinary remedy of overrul-
ing for situations in which the course set by precedent is one of “sure
error.”137  The Justices must be fully convinced before they will disrupt set-
tled law, and “middling” evidence of a miscue is not enough.138  This insis-
tence on a double check is another crucial function of stare decisis in
modern law.
The stare decisis analysis is, quite naturally, most significant for prece-
dents that a majority of sitting Justices believe to be wrong.139  A recent trea-
tise describes the correctness of an earlier decision as the “primary and most
important factor” in determining whether it should be overruled.140  There
is complexity beneath the surface, for it is not clear that a decision’s wrong-
ness ought to be part of the stare decisis calculus at all.141  Perhaps the analy-
sis of a decision’s merits and the application of stare decisis should be kept
separate.  Consider the position of Justice Kagan, who contends that saying a
decision is poorly reasoned is “just more of the same” merits analysis that
kicks off the stare decisis inquiry in the first place.142  The claim is that the
merits inquiry is relevant only to the threshold question whether a precedent
is wrong—not to the subsequent, and analytically distinct, question whether
it ought to be retained despite its wrongness.
135 See supra Section I.A.
136 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
137 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010). But cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (“[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent.”).
138 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019).
139 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Essay, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1943
(2008) (distinguishing appeals to authority from persuasion on the merits).
140 GARNER ET AL., supra note 25, at 397.
141 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
142 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2497
& n.4 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Notwithstanding this challenge, the Supreme Court frequently has
included a precedent’s reasoning as part of the stare decisis inquiry.143  The
best way to understand that practice is as a double check.  Examining a prior
opinion’s premises, assumptions, and chain of reasoning helps to confirm
the initial impression of wrongness.  Today’s Court begins by figuring out
what it believes to be the best reading of the provision at issue.  It then pro-
ceeds to evaluate the precedent’s reasoning on its own terms.
There is an element of double counting here, as the Court is likely to
have confronted some aspects of the precedent’s reasoning during its initial
inquiry into the merits.144  Even so, the double check is a way of confirming
the Justices’ preliminary suspicions.  Circling back ensures complete engage-
ment with the rationale that led one’s judicial predecessors to a different
result.  It generates confidence that a precedent truly is incorrect, and that
today’s Justices fully appreciate all the arguments in its favor.145  As Hale
observed, judges are likely to be “better acquainted with the reasonableness”
of their own theories than with the logic of rules announced prior to their
tenure.146  Deference to precedent provides a means of checking this
tendency.
Apart from concerns about a precedent’s conclusions, a Justice might
doubt the integrity of the precedent’s factual premises.147  For example,
when the Court overruled its precedents relating to states’ taxation authority
over out-of-state retailers, it looked not only to those precedents’ logic, but
also to the dramatic changes in remote selling brought about by the internet
era.148 Not every legal argument depends so heavily on empirical realities
143 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (observing that “when it
revisits a precedent this Court has traditionally considered” factors including “the quality
of a decision’s reasoning” (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499
(2019))); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2478–79); Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1499; Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79.
144 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 409 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (raising a concern about double counting).
145 See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“[The principle of stare decisis] is grounded in a basic
humility that recognizes today’s legal issues are often not so different from the questions of
yesterday and that we are not the first ones to try to answer them.”); AMAR, supra note 17, at
234 (discussing the role of precedent in encouraging Justices to reflect on the correctness
of their initial impressions).
146 Matthew Hale, Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dia-
logue of the Lawe, in W.S. Holdworth, Sir Matthew Hale on Hobbes: An Unpublished Ms., 37
L.Q. REV. 274, 291 (1921).
147 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting
the relevance of factual change to the stare decisis analysis).
148 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018).  Some Justices have
extended this type of analysis to the First Amendment by arguing that changes in the
media landscape underscore the need to revisit key precedents dealing with broadcast
radio and television. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 530–32 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 24 11-MAY-21 9:07
1994 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
and assumptions.149  Sometimes, though, decisional rationales are inter-
twined with factual premises.  When those premises become untenable, it is
time for a fresh look.  By insisting on such a showing even after finding that
the precedent’s logic is problematic on its own terms, the Court confirms the
import of stare decisis in demanding more than disapproval of a precedent’s
chain of reasoning.
This double-checking function serves as one more way in which stare
decisis exerts influence on the Court’s decisionmaking.  Even when the
Court ultimately departs from a prior decision, the process that it follows can
reveal a great deal about the Justices’ attitude toward precedent more
generally.
IV. PRECEDENT’S PROMISE: Bivens as Case Study
I have argued that precedent plays a crucial role in federal adjudication,
including at the U.S. Supreme Court.  But there is room for improvement.
Notwithstanding the variety of ways in which precedent influences the law,
the Court sometimes departs too hastily from disfavored decisions.  Particu-
larly when a decision rests on reasoning that the Court has since come to
doubt, the pull of precedent can seem like an afterthought.  A robust doc-
trine of stare decisis demands something more.
To demonstrate how the invigoration of stare decisis might proceed, I
turn to Bivens as a case study.150  This Symposium is dedicated to exploring
Bivens at fifty.  My question is whether Bivens should make it to sixty.  The
answer, I submit, is yes.
At base, the argument for overruling is that Bivens reflects a mode of
interpretation that several Justices have come to disapprove.  In the decades
since Bivens issued, the Court’s willingness to imply rights of action has given
way to concerns about unwarranted judicial lawmaking.  Far from being a
justification for departing from precedent, this development is all the more
reason to embrace stare decisis.  Reaffirming Bivens would furnish tangible
evidence of the Court’s commitment to precedent even as interpretive phi-
losophies shift.  It would bolster the doctrine of stare decisis in pursuit of a
stable and impersonal rule of law.
Bivens is indeed the product of another time.  But the judiciary is
timeless.
149 To return to an example introduced above, the majority’s analysis in Citizens United
v. FEC depended more heavily on political theory than it did on factual changes. See 558
U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (grounding a departure from precedent in the pursuit of an unfet-
tered marketplace of ideas).
150 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
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A. Doctrinal Trajectory
The controversy in Bivens arose from allegations of an unlawful search
and arrest carried out by federal narcotics agents.151  The plaintiff sought
damages from the agents for violating the Fourth Amendment.152  The
Fourth Amendment, though, says nothing about damages.  It provides that
the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”153
Nor was there any federal statute that authorized the recovery.  The question
became whether the courts should imply a right of action for damages
against federal officials.
Bivens said yes.  The Supreme Court cited Marbury v. Madison and reaf-
firmed “the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”154  The Court analogized to the field of stat-
utory interpretation, in which it had implied rights of action notwithstanding
the lack of express authorization by Congress.155  And it observed that “dam-
ages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty.”156
In the ensuing years, the Court applied Bivens to infringements of other
constitutional liberties.157  Its opinions reiterated that “the victims of a consti-
tutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages,” unless
there are “special factors counselling hesitation” or alternative remedies cre-
ated by Congress.158
The doctrine, though, took a turn.  In its statutory cases, the Court
retreated from, and then renounced, its prior willingness to imply causes of
actions.159  The Court likewise began to look at Bivens’s approach with
heightened skepticism, declining to extend the case’s framework to new situ-
ations.160  Still, the Court described Bivens as “settled law” and disclaimed
151 See id. at 389.
152 See id. at 389–90.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
154 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803)).
155 See id. at 396.
156 Id. at 395.
157 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230
(1979); James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal
Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 570 (2020) (“For the
next decade [after Bivens], the Supreme Court and lower courts read Bivens broadly as
creating a general claim for damages caused by constitutional violations . . . .”).
158 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
159 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741–42 (2020).
160 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)); Pfander et al., supra note 157, at 574 (noting that “the
Court has turned away Bivens claims” for reasons including “a changing conception of the
role of federal courts in recognizing judge-made rights to sue”).
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any effort to “cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of
Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose.”161
The Court’s most recent engagement with Bivens occurred in Hernández
v. Mesa.  That case involved a damages claim against a federal agent who,
from the U.S. side of the border, shot and killed a Mexican teenager stand-
ing on Mexican soil.162  The Court declined to permit a damages action
based on the cross-border shooting, citing concerns about disrupting the sep-
aration of powers on matters of foreign relations and national security.163
Hernández also observed that Bivens and the cases extending it “were the
products of an era when the Court routinely inferred ‘causes of action’ that
were ‘not explicit’ in the text of the provision that was allegedly violated.”164
That era, the Court explained, is over.  When faced with a request to apply
Bivens’s framework to a new context, the Court’s “watchword” is now
“caution.”165
Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) went further.  He reasoned
that the Court’s renunciation of its prior approach to implied rights of action
in the statutory context had—quite properly, given the respective roles of
legislature and judiciary—“repudiated the foundation of the Bivens doc-
trine.”166  The next step, he contended, is to overrule Bivens itself.167
B. Bivens as Precedent
1. Durability of Structural Principles
According to Bivens’s most prominent detractors, the decision’s cardinal
offense is structural: it violates the separation of powers by empowering
courts to act as lawmakers in determining whether a private action for dam-
ages is available.168  In evaluating the force of Bivens as a precedent, one
might wonder whether this objection is enough to end the stare decisis
inquiry as soon as it begins.  The claim would be that judicial decisions that
misconstrue the Constitution’s structural safeguards contain the seeds of
their own demise.
This position finds some support in the caselaw.  The Court occasionally
has expressed a sense of urgency about rectifying mistaken interpretations of
structural principles.169  But the Court has discussed other types of decisions
161 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57 (2017).
162 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.
163 Id. at 739.
164 Id. at 741 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855).
165 Id. at 742.
166 Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167 See id. at 752–53.
168 See id. (“Federal courts lack the authority to engage in the distinctly legislative task
of creating causes of action for damages to enforce federal positive law.”).
169 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (“If it becomes
apparent that the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from exercising
their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, the Court should be vigilant in cor-
recting the error.”).
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in much the same way.  It has suggested that precedents are subject to over-
ruling if they permit the improper restriction of speech, facilitate unlawful
searches, and so on.170  Structural precedents, then, are not exactly special.
Perhaps the Court is composing a list of various issues—including but not
limited to matters of constitutional structure—to which stare decisis has little
application.  Yet the cases do not seem to warrant that conclusion, which
runs counter to the Court’s more general statements about the role of stare
decisis in promoting the rule of law.171
In the end, it is difficult to characterize the Court’s identification of cer-
tain categories of vulnerable decisions—including decisions on matters of
constitutional structure—as a systematic effort to expound the law of prece-
dent.  The better understanding is that the Court’s statements reflect the nat-
ural lawyerly inclination to make arguments of the sort that “if stare decisis
ever must yield, surely it must do so here.” Bivens, then, is not subject to
overruling based on incompatibility with the separation of powers as properly
understood.  Even if that charge is valid, it demonstrates only that Bivens is
wrong.  There must be some additional reason to warrant an overruling.  In
the parlance of the Court, what is required is a special justification above and
beyond disagreement with Bivens on the merits.172
2. Continuity Across Time
Most of the potential justifications for overruling have little purchase
when it comes to Bivens.  The decision does not rest on mistaken or outmo-
ded factual premises.173  Nor has it been unworkable in application.174  And
its consequences, while detrimental on some accounts, fall far short of caus-
ing the type of extraordinary harm that demands alleviation.175  The recogni-
tion of damages claims against federal officials looks nothing like the
validation of segregation, the striking down of minimum wage laws, or the
authorization of warrantless wiretapping—the types of consequences Chief
Justice Roberts has highlighted in explaining why stare decisis must some-
times yield.176
170 See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 483–86 (2017).
171 See supra notes 60–64.
172 See generally KOZEL, supra note 14 (discussing the requirement of a special justifica-
tion for overruling).
173 See, e.g., Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (including factual changes as part of the
stare decisis analysis).
174 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)) (noting the role of workability in the stare decisis analysis).
175 Cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part) (noting that “the Court may . . . scrutinize [a] precedent’s real-world effects on the
citizenry”).
176 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (citing decisions including
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as supporting the principle that the Court
may overrule cases based on their harmful effects).  For a discussion of the role of substan-
tive effects in informing the stare decisis analysis, see KOZEL, supra note 14, at 121–23.
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If there are grounds for overruling Bivens, they must be found else-
where.  The basic argument is simple: Bivens is the product of another, less
enlightened time.  Though the Court once was willing to recognize damages
claims arising by implication, things have changed dramatically.177  The
Court has refrained from implying rights of action in the statutory context,
eroding Bivens’s foundation.  It has also refused to extend Bivens to novel
constitutional disputes, generating a growing list of decisions that cast doubt
on the premise that damages actions should be implied from constitutional
guarantees.178  At some point in the past fifty years, the sun set on Bivens—
even if one cannot identify the precise moment.
This type of challenge, which treats precedent as subject to overruling
based on developments in related areas of the law, is not unique to Bivens.
The Supreme Court has accepted versions of it in recent cases like Janus v.
American Federation (dealing with public-sector labor unions)179 and Citizens
United v. FEC (dealing with corporate political speech).180  But despite its
familiarity, the argument is subject to dispute.  For starters, even if other lines
of cases have moved in a different direction, there still may be good reason to
view a precedent as worthy of retention within its own domain.181  Moreover,
the fact that subsequent cases are in some ways inconsistent with a given pre-
cedent does not alter the precedent’s status as binding law, so long as the
Court has left it intact.
Bivens illustrates the point.  Even as the Court has declined to extend
Bivens to new contexts, it has reiterated its commitment to that decision’s
doctrinal approach, including in its most recent engagement with the doc-
trine.  It is true that Hernández v. Mesa rejected the prospect of a damages
claim on the facts at hand.  But it did so based on an application of Bivens
itself.  Rather than contesting the relevant doctrinal framework, Hernández
asked the same question Bivens asked five decades earlier: are there “special
factors” that make a damages claim inappropriate?182 Bivens said no. Her-
nández said yes, citing considerations—namely, implications for national
security and foreign relations—that were not present in Bivens.
If Hernández is sound, these must be convincing reasons for distinguish-
ing Bivens.  By contrast, if the reasons for distinguishing Bivens are uncon-
vincing, Hernández is unsound.  In neither case is any doubt cast on Bivens.
And if the argument is that jurisprudential conflict already existed based on
177 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing Bivens as “a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law
powers to create causes of action” (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
178 See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742–43 (2020) (“[F]or almost 40 years, we
have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.”).
179 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2483–84 (2018).
180 558 U.S. 310, 348–50 (2010).
181 See KOZEL, supra note 14, at 114–15.
182 See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1880
(2017)).
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the Court’s prior engagements with Bivens, the Court’s introduction of new
distinctions in Hernández is difficult to understand.  To be sure, the Hernández
Court did not need to overrule Bivens to reach its result.  But neither did it
need to emphasize national security and foreign relations.  That it chose the
latter path reflects continuing respect for Bivens as law.  To overrule Bivens,
then, would be to act inconsistently with Hernández—as well as other cases in
which the Court has reiterated its commitment to Bivens even while refusing
to recognize a damages claim.183
There are also practical problems with treating a purported conflict
between two lines of cases as sufficient justification for overruling one of
them.  Doing so creates troubling incentives for the treatment of precedent.
It encourages judges to marginalize a disfavored decision as a means of build-
ing a record for when the decision finally stands trial.  Such an approach
supplants a robust commitment to stare decisis with a requirement that over-
rulings occur in stages.  A slow-motion overruling may be preferable to an
abrupt one, but neither approach promotes impersonality and continuity to
the same degree as the preservation of precedent.
Let us stipulate for the moment that Bivens is in tension with later cases
refusing to extend it, not to mention cases criticizing implied rights of action
in the statutory context.  The question remains which line of cases should
prevail.  The obvious answer is whichever line is correct.  But making that
determination depends on contested matters of interpretive philosophy—
matters that, in the Bivens context, relate to the justifiability of implying dam-
ages claims in the absence of express authorization, as well as the broader
relationship between constitutional rights and remedies.  A principal func-
tion of stare decisis is to avoid these types of disputes by seeking common
ground.  A shared commitment to precedent allows Justices to compromise
on solutions that, if not perfect from any perspective, are good enough for
everyone.184
Rather than grounding an argument for overruling in Bivens’s ostensible
inconsistency with other lines of cases, one might focus on what subsequent
developments in the law reveal about Bivens itself.  By validating a cause of
action for damages without explicit authorization in constitutional or statu-
tory text, the Bivens Court arguably engaged in unsound reasoning.  Perhaps
that factor should be enough to doom Bivens as a precedent.
The immediate obstacle to this claim is the Court’s embrace of the prin-
ciple that disagreement with a decision’s rationale is not enough to warrant
its abandonment.185  In response, one might endorse a variant that supports
the overruling of decisions that are not just flawed, but clearly or exception-
183 Similar lessons extend to the practice of the lower courts; the Bivens framework
remains the law, and it ought to apply absent special factors—of the sort recognized in
cases like Hernández—counseling otherwise.
184 For commentary on the role of precedent in furnishing common ground, see, for
example, STRAUSS, supra note 87, at 102; Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential
Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (2013).
185 See supra Section II.B.
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ally flawed.186  This latter formulation preserves the idea that overruling is an
exceptional act.  After all, the universe of clearly erroneous precedents is, by
definition, a subset of wrong decisions.  Nevertheless, even a formulation
that limits overrulings to decisions whose reasoning is clearly erroneous
becomes problematic if it tends to collapse into judgments about interpretive
philosophy.187
That is precisely how the argument from clear error would apply to a
case like Bivens.  To call Bivens’s reasoning clearly erroneous is, in effect, to
depict the decision as the product of a different era of interpretive philoso-
phy.  But shifts in interpretive philosophy are not special or remarkable.
They are standard fare.  As such, they fall short of justifying the exceptional
act of overruling.188  Characterizing Bivens as unsound, anachronistic, and
inconsistent with other cases is really just saying the same thing in three dif-
ferent ways.  All three amount to charges against Bivens on the merits—
charges that are insufficient to support a departure under a robust system of
precedent.
There was a time in the Supreme Court’s history when implying rights of
action was seen as unproblematic, even necessary.  During a subsequent
period, the Court came to view that practice as ill-advised.  We remain in the
latter era now, though that is not to say we could never return to the former.
In all events, stare decisis implores the Justices to commit themselves to a rule
of law that transcends philosophical disagreements.  Modern-day objections
to Bivens revolve around its embodiment of an interpretive approach that has
fallen out of favor.  The critical work of stare decisis entails bridging method-
ological disagreements, thereby preserving the continuity of law even as pre-
vailing philosophies shift.189  It is only by working across methodologies,
philosophies, and ideologies that judges can separate the work of the courts
from the province of politics.
This is an argument for preserving, and reaffirming, Bivens.  It also car-
ries broader implications for the doctrine of stare decisis.  The debates over
186 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concur-
ring in part) (discussing the treatment of decisions that are “grievously or egregiously
wrong”); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (concluding that the relevant
precedent, which involved an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, “was not just wrong”;
rather, “[i]ts reasoning was exceptionally ill founded and conflicted with much of our tak-
ings jurisprudence”); cf. DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 122 (noting the argument for overrul-
ing unauthorized exercises of judicial discretion).  For an analysis of the impact of clear
error, see generally Nelson, supra note 46.
187 Cf. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1432 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that “the Court
should have a body of neutral principles on the question of overruling precedent”).
188 Justice Alito recently discussed the interplay between precedent and judicial philos-
ophy in the context of criminal procedure. See id. at 1433 (noting the ramifications of
“label[ing] all functionalist decisions as poorly reasoned” given that functionalism was
prominent during an earlier era of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence).
189 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis
. . . demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or
stay the same.”).
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Bivens provide the Supreme Court with a valuable opportunity.  The Justices
could use the case to underscore the principle that legal rules retain their
validity notwithstanding developments in interpretive theory.  In doing so,
the Court would crystallize the distinction between the content of the law
and the identity of the Justices.  Different Presidents will appoint different
Justices with different interpretive philosophies.  The Justices will rely on
their respective philosophies in resolving the cases before them.  Sometimes
that will mean a case is decided differently than it would have been had a
majority of Justices been appointed by another President.  But the dynamic
changes with an applicable precedent on the books.  Now the ability of
today’s Justices to put their stamp on the law is limited.  This effect occurs by
design, drawing on a belief that the rule of law is best served by solicitude for
institutional continuity even if that means some perceived errors will go
uncorrected.
3. Impact of Persistence
While the Supreme Court has refused to recognize damages claims for
certain constitutional violations, it has left Bivens intact.  This is perhaps easi-
est to see in the Court’s discussions of Bivens before the turn of the century,
which “tend[ed] to confirm the viability of the Bivens doctrine” despite
“find[ing] it inapplicable to the case at hand.”190  Only later did more foun-
dational challenges to Bivens gain momentum at the Court, casting doubt on
judicial “recognition of implied rights to sue.”191
Notwithstanding these challenges, Bivens remains on the books.  Even
the Court’s 2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which criticized Bivens in fairly
strident terms, reached its resolution through a process decidedly internal to
the Bivens framework.192 Ziglar concluded that damages claims are unavaila-
ble when they would challenge “a high-level executive policy created in the
wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil.”193  That conclusion is
consistent with the notion that Bivens-type actions might be inappropriate in
situations where there are special factors, not present in Bivens itself, that
demonstrate the unsuitability of damages claims.194  The remainder of
Ziglar’s discussion of Bivens did little more than enumerate some of the fac-
tors that judges and Justices should consider in deciding whether a damages
action is available.  Understood against this backdrop, Ziglar’s characteriza-
tion of “expanding the Bivens remedy” as a “ ‘disfavored’ judicial activity” was
an impression formed after evaluating the relevant factors, not an imperative
190 Pfander et al., supra note 157, at 575; see also id. (noting that “[a]lthough Wilkie [v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007),] declined to recognize a Bivens claim in the specific context
of retaliatory takings, it did not denigrate the enterprise of weighing factors relevant to the
wisdom of allowing the suit to proceed”).
191 Id.
192 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859, 1864–65 (2017).
193 Id. at 1860.
194 Id.
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that carries binding effect in future cases.195  Neither Ziglar, Hernández, nor
any other case has rejected Bivens or foreclosed the availability of damages
claims.  That fact is just as important as the “caution” urged by the Court.196
The Court recently observed in a different context that precedent must
be viewed “on its own terms, not through gloss added by a later Court in
dicta.”197  The same is true of Bivens.  If the Court wishes to overrule Bivens,
the requisite steps are well established.  Until then, Bivens remains the law of
the land.  It was Bivens that recognized the possibility of “special factors coun-
selling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”198  Over
time, the Court has more readily found such factors to be present.199  Yet it
has preserved Bivens, leaving open the possibility that in the next case, it
might tighten its conception of the special factors counselling hesitation and
reaffirm its commitment to a doctrinal framework that has been in place for
fifty years.200
C. Defining Bivens’s Scope
This Part has made two claims.  First, under the law of stare decisis, there
is no special justification for overruling Bivens.  Second, by confirming that
Bivens remains good law despite its being the product of a bygone era of legal
interpretation, the Supreme Court can infuse both Bivens and the doctrine of
stare decisis with added potency.
Before closing the Part, I take a brief detour from Bivens’s strength—
meaning its resiliency in the face of arguments for overruling—to add a few
words about the decision’s scope.  These reflections on scope do not affect
the foregoing discussion of Bivens’s durability.  I offer them simply because
they bear on a different feature of the law of precedent, relating to the con-
straining authority of doctrinal frameworks, which Bivens provides useful
occasion to explore.
195 Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
196 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020).
197 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2200 n.4 (2020); cf.
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2138, 2141–42 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“We should respect the statement in Whole Woman’s Health
that it was applying the undue burden standard of Casey.”).
198 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
199 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 296–97 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (noting increased resistance to judicially implied damages claims
in the years since Bivens was decided).
200 Cf. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (noting that when a decision under review “departed from the cases that came
before it,” the Court “better serves the values of stare decisis” by “‘[r]emaining true to an
“intrinsically sounder” doctrine established in prior cases’” (quoting Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995) (plurality opinion))).
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A precedent’s scope is the universe of propositions for which it consti-
tutes binding authority.201  In defining the scope of precedent, the starting
point is identifying the legal provision that the precedent construed.  With
respect to Bivens, the Supreme Court implied a damages claim based on an
unlawful search and arrest.202  If Bivens is properly understood as involving
an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not and could
not create a binding precedent with respect to other amendments.  Federal
courts may not issue advisory opinions, nor may they infuse conjecture with
precedential effect that constrains future judges.203  To be sure, one might
believe the logic of Bivens applies to other amendments just as it does the
Fourth.  Alternatively or in addition, one might see virtue in a coherent
approach to implied damages claims across different constitutional provi-
sions.  But arguments of that sort are not arguments from precedent.204
They do not entail the conclusion that Bivens exerts binding force outside
the search-and-seizure domain where it originated.
On this theory, if the Supreme Court was correct to accept Bivens-type
arguments for violations of other constitutional provisions, it is because those
arguments were sound on their own terms.  Likewise, if the Court was right to
reject similar arguments in other contexts, it was due to the unique consider-
ations those contexts presented regarding the suitability of implying damages
claims.  Stare decisis is beside the point.
Yet there is another way to understand Bivens, one that carries very dif-
ferent ramifications for its scope as a precedent.  Perhaps we should view the
case not as an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather as a
remedial doctrine.205 Bivens, the argument goes, does not tell any judge or
Justice how to interpret the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, it identifies a type
of remedy that is available across a range of constitutional liberties.206  What
is more, Bivens derives its framework from background remedial rules, not
from the text of any rights-granting provision such as the Fourth Amend-
201 On the distinction between precedential scope and precedential strength as well as
various theories of precedential scope, see generally KOZEL, supra note 14, at 21–25; Larry
Alexander, Precedential Constraint, Its Scope and Strength: A Brief Survey of the Possibilities and
Their Merits, in 3 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRECEDENT 75 (Thomas Bustamante & Carlos
Bernal Pulido eds., 2012).
202 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
203 See GARNER ET AL., supra note 25, at 133 (“A decision rendered on a purely hypothet-
ical question has no precedential force.”).
204 See Schauer, supra note 98, at 576.
205 For a related argument with respect to the Chevron doctrine of administrative law,
see generally F. Andrew Hessick, Remedial Chevron, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018).
206 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–96 (“Historically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”); see also Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a
federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite
the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”).
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ment.207  This distinction is significant, for if Bivens is an exposition of gen-
eral remedial principles, its scope may be more extensive than if it is an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment alone.208
Of course, Bivens did not hold that damages follow constitutional viola-
tions as day follows night.  Damages claims are permissible only absent “spe-
cial factors” that counsel against their availability.209  We should not be
surprised by occasional disputes over whether such factors are present in a
given case.  But the broader takeaway is that if Bivens is properly understood
as a remedial doctrine, it sets forth the binding framework for determining
the availability of damages claims against federal officials for a variety of con-
stitutional wrongs.  As we have seen, neither Hernández nor any of its prede-
cessors casts doubt on that conclusion.210  While the Court has deemed
damages claims inappropriate in certain situations, it has preserved the Biv-
ens rubric.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court continues to express deep respect for precedent.
While leaving room for each Justice to consult her own interpretive philoso-
phy in adjudicating disputes, the Court describes stare decisis as critical to
preserving its identity as an enduring institution greater than the sum of its
parts.  Translating these principles into practice, the Court has insisted on a
special justification before departing from precedent.  Despite challenges to
the legitimacy of stare decisis, and notwithstanding expressions of doubt over
its efficacy, the doctrine continues to hang around.
207 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (acknowledging that “the Fourth Amendment does not in
so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the conse-
quences of its violation,” but analogizing to the rule that “‘where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done’” (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946))); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011)
(observing that “Bivens is under a cloud, because it is based on a concept of federal com-
mon law no longer in favor in the courts”); Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State
Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 524–25
(2013) (noting that “the Bivens line of cases has come to be seen as an example of federal
common lawmaking”); cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 293 (1995) (“The insight at the heart of Bivens is that the judiciary
has a duty to enforce the Constitution. . . . If the remedy is not forthcoming from the
political branches, the Court must provide it.”).
208 Whether these background principles sound in federal common law or in the Con-
stitution itself is beyond my purview here.  For analysis, see, for example, Walter E. Dellin-
ger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1541–42
(1972) (considering the Supreme Court’s authority to create remedies via Article III);
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1975)
(writing of Bivens that “unless the Court views a damage action as an indispensable reme-
dial dimension of the underlying guarantee, it is not constitutional interpretation, but
common law” (footnote omitted)).
209 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
210 See supra Section IV.A.
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We can think of Bivens the same way.  Over the years, Bivens has faced
serious criticism, including at the Court.  Still, the Bivens framework remains
controlling.  Debates over the reach of Bivens do not alter the fact that the
decision continues to hang around.  And in constitutional law, hanging
around is half the battle.
The persistence of Bivens leaves the door open for its reinvigoration.  It
would take only a case or two to change the narrative from a slow erosion of
Bivens to its durability over the years.  The same goes for the doctrine of stare
decisis more generally.  Though stare decisis is not in doubt, the Court occa-
sionally seems quick to depart from decisions whose reasoning is dubious in
the eyes of today’s Justices.  By making clear that shifts in interpretive philos-
ophy are not license to disrupt settled law, the Court can take another step
toward safeguarding the place of precedent.
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